Monday, January 12, 2009

Imagination and the world

Some final thoughts before tomorrow night, to prompt further musings (and where are the rest of you on this blog, huh? Cowards! Pikers! Miscreants and bludgers!)...

There is almost incontrovertible evidence (personal, if not meeting the standards of scientific empiricial proof, but that's another argument) that it is, on occasion, possible to see future events. I have experienced absolutely compelling examples, and they are not at all uncommon. That such a thing could occur seems entirely at odds with the notion of a world of random particular motion, still our scientific in-theory. Instead it suggests that the world is comprised of meaningful forms in wholistic motion and change. It suggests that stories, images, human events, have their own existence not merely derived from simpler, lower level parts.

This suggests to me the idea of the world as an 'imagined' place, in which its moods, colours, joys, horrors, meanings, are intrinsic to it, not 'epiphenomena', not secondary, not illusory.

Another related thought: have we literally privileged one side of the brain in our scientific ontology? (Note to Zaf: not egotism to use this word, it's essential.) What I mean is, the left side of our brain perceives structure, logical relationships, linearity, causality, parts. The right side perceives form, similarity, quality, the whole. Doesn't it seem strange that only one side of the brain perceives 'reality'? We have a left brain ontology, or theory of being. It privileges structure and causation as 'real', derides right brain impressions as fluff and illusion.

What would a right-brain ontology look like?

This all being a left-brain analysis, of course, which is why I encourage some right-brain responses tomorrow night, even if we are more awkward in this territory.

That's it.

Post, you bastards, post!

No comments: